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Special Report

Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution: The First Decade

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
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FIDEL CASTRO AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION: THE FIRST DECADE

Fidel Castro is the first Latin American caudillo to have personally created a total social and political revolution. His success is attributable to his ability to portray himself to the majority of Cubans as the life force of the revolution, to his creation of a ruling apparatus of total power and an effective propaganda machine, and to his cautious and systematic approach in radicalizing his government while encouraging the mass emigration of his opponents. Although many of his programs have been extremely unpopular, he has been able to uphold his patriarchal image—disassociated from specific failures of the revolution. Most important, however, is Castro's success in educating and indoctrinating the new generation. An overwhelming majority of the youth are fervidly loyal to Castro. Thus, although he has radically reordered life in Cuba in just one decade, Castro is now as firmly in control as at any time since coming to power.



Castro has in the last ten years achieved most of his primary objectives at home and abroad. He has consolidated his personal rule, removed Cuba from the influence and orbit of the United States, uprooted Cuba's traditional ruling groups, elevated the peasantry and the poor, and redistributed and equalized wealth and privilege. He has also succeeded in creating a dynamic charisma about the Cuban Revolution and its leaders even though it is largely contrived and inconsistent with what he has actually done.

Castro's other principal objectives—to help Latin American revolutionaries emulate the Cuban Revolution and to achieve economic prosperity in Cuba—have been more elusive. Although he has been mainly preoccupied with domestic problems, Castro probably considers his inability to “export” the revolution as the greatest failure of his foreign policy. Despite continuing Soviet aid, the Cuban economy has failed to make progress. Acute shortages of almost every kind of consumer goods have prevailed since 1961.

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CONSOLIDATION AND ORGANIZATION OF POWER

Fidel Castro's 26th of July Movement and the orthodox Communist party—the Popular Socialist Party (PSP)—were the only organized political groups in Cuba in January 1959. The PSP did not fully support Castro's movement until the eve of its victory, but by late 1959 attempted to join forces with it in a united front. Castro was reluctant to establish new national institutions until he had destroyed or replaced the ones he had inherited and for the first two and a half years he ruled without a formalized national political organization.

Economic deterioration and chaos increased as the skills of the disenfranchised middle and upper class groups were lost. As a result of radical nationalization measures and economic disruptions, there was more discontent and overt politi-

cal opposition in 1961 and 1962 than there has been at any other time during Castro's administration. His position, however, was secured by his 26th of July followers who had taken control of the military and security forces and by the popularity he enjoyed with the masses. As a result, he was able to withstand economic disorders, organized opposition, mounting discontent, and the Bay of Pigs invasion.

By mid-1961 Castro found it necessary to institutionalize his regime to deal with internal pressures and win favor with Moscow. He merged the 26th of July group and the "old guard" PSP Communists into a new "united socialist party" which was intended ultimately to become the ruling political party in Cuba. With the backstage support of the Soviet ambassador, the "old guard" soon dominated the party. In March 1962, however, Castro purged most "old guard"



Fidel Castro dates his Revolution to 26 July 1953 when, with his younger brother Raul and a group of followers, he led an attack in a provincial army post. He was captured by Batista's forces, imprisoned, and in 1956 exiled to Mexico where he was joined by Ernesto Che Guevara. With a small group they sailed to Cuba in December 1956 and for the next two years built up a guerrilla force of several thousand which ultimately succeeded in toppling the Batista dictatorship. The 26th of July Movement succeeded mainly because Batista was extremely unpopular even within his own armed forces, and because Castro because immensely popular with the masses and middle class groups

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members and requested the recall of the Soviet ambassador. The party was completely reconstructed and the vast majority of new members were chosen from the military and the working classes.

In October 1965, the party was formally constituted as the Cuban Communist Party with a central committee of 100 and has grown to an estimated 65,000 members with a strong provincial and local organization. The party was originally intended to become the ruling political apparatus and Castro promised that a "socialist constitution" would be promulgated at a party congress in 1966. Still wary of strong civilian bureaucrats, however, he has procrastinated about formally instituting party or constitutional rule, and further delay is likely.

Since his 1962 experience with the "old guard" bureaucrats, Castro has never fully trusted the civilian institutions and bureaucracy created by the regime. As a result, he has conducted frequent ministerial reorganizations, "administrative purges," and purges of "dilettantes and loafers"—including one party central committee member. In 1965 and again in 1967 harsh antibureaucracy purges were undertaken and ministries and agencies were compelled to reduce their staffs by as much as 75 percent. Although in most of these cases Castro was interested in reassigning surplus white collar workers to agricultural work, the frequency and intensity of the drives emphasize his basic distrust of formal civilian organizations. The "microfaction" purge of January 1968 included two central committee members and several dozen other minor regime officials. It was followed in March by the radical "revolutionary offensive" which resulted in the emergence of the military establishment as the supreme institutional force.

THE MILITARY AS MAIN BUTTRESS

During the entire decade that Castro has been in power his position has been firmly anchored by the military and security forces through a number of senior officers who are veterans of the 26th of July Movement. Senior officers comprise about two thirds of the central committee of the Communist Party. In addition to Fidel and Raul Castro, four other army majors are on the eight-man politburo. Military men make up at least one fifth of the party membership. In January 1968, the first of the political bureau delegates was appointed as a permanent inspector and supervisor of the Matanzas Province party bureau. By early November, at least six other majors were appointed to similar posts to represent Castro and the politburo in other provinces, regions, and in industry. Thus, originally constituted with a wide representation of military and civilian leaders, the Cuban Communist Party is under the exclusive control of Castro and a personal entourage of army majors.

These same men dominate almost all other public institutions and mass organizations through the party. In 1968, the military were responsible for mobilizing tens of thousands of civilians for the sugar harvest and other agricultural work. This year the Ministry of the Armed Forces is directing the harvest. During the past two years the military also assumed complete control of civil aviation, and began the reorganization of pre-university education. The increasingly martial environment is dramatized incessantly by Cuban public information media, and Castro and his colleagues from the 26th of July Movement have become a cult of "guerrilla heroes."

The military has become the supreme institutional force probably because the officer

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corps is the only organized element that Castro completely trusts. The officer corps consists of about 200 majors (the highest military rank) and an unknown number of captains and junior officers. Most of the latter were commissioned after Castro came to power, and although they are not members of the 26th of July group they have been subjected to extensive political indoctrination and military discipline and are loyal to the regime. No Cuban military officer on active duty has defected to the US in several years, although a few noncommissioned officers and some conscripts have defected via the Guantanamo Naval Base.

Because most of the senior majors are simple, unsophisticated men who are uncomfortable with the power they have acquired, and because they are devoted to Castro, few of them are considered politically ambitious. Field commanders are regularly rotated, and Raul Castro and his deputies conduct frequent field tours. Thus, although little is known about them, the loyalties of Castro's colleagues clearly transcend the ideological and the political. Very few were exposed to Marxist-Leninist thought before 1959 and even now their ideological commitments are

probably shallow. So deep is their personal commitment to Castro, however, that the cult of his personality has become for them an ideology.

CASTRO'S POPULARITY

Fidel Castro has consistently been able to maintain the support of a majority of the population. He has achieved this because of his charisma and because of the effectiveness of the propaganda machine he controls. Castro's popularity has remained relatively high because he has encouraged the mass exodus of his opponents and critics. Since 1959 between 500,000 and 700,000 Cubans have left the island, and about 1,000 more leave weekly on the Varadero-Miami airlift. Many others have left in small boats or via "fence jumping" at the US Navy base at Guantanamo. Most of the legal refugees are middle aged or elderly and former members of the middle and upper classes.

As a result of this steady migration of the disenfranchised and the high rate of population growth, the groups most favored and benefited by Castro have become larger in proportion to the rest of the population. The median age has steadily declined since 1959; in January 1969, an estimated 55 percent of the population was under 25. The vast majority of them who are in school are probably fervent supporters of Castro. The oldest were only 14 when Castro came to power, and they have been subjected ever since to an intense and effective propaganda assault.

The radical and "puritanical" reforms imposed last year, however, caused a deterioration of Castro's popularity even among the groups he has most favored. Last March he announced a harsh "revolutionary offensive." He closed all bars and nightclubs in Cuba, reduced beer production, outlawed gambling and cock-fighting, mobilized tens of thousands of civilians into agricultural work brigades, upgraded the military over



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Queuing up for food

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the civilian bureaucracy, and nationalized more than 57,000 small private businesses. Castro railed against "cafe pundits" and barroom philosophers, and insisted that city dwellers and youths perform "volunteer" agricultural work. In addition, mainly because of the severe drought of 1967, food shortages increased last year, and the list of rationed goods was expanded. In January 1969 even sugar was rationed.

As a result of the shortages and austerity, there was increased dissatisfaction and a number of isolated acts of sabotage and vandalism against the regime. More than 1,000 Cubans defected by way of the Guantanamo Naval Base in 1968 (about twice as many as in 1967), and there have been about 120 defections this year. The level of isolated dissidence appears to be mainly a result of the increased hardships, and there is no evidence of organized resistance to the regime. Increased food production this year should ameliorate some of these problems. Despite such fluctuations, however, Castro probably retains the hard core support of large majorities of the youth, peasants, and various working class groups.

THE YOUTH

Under Castro the youth have been granted special privileges and endowments, and their loyalty to the regime is a result of these benefits as much as an outgrowth of the propaganda effort. All education is free. Tuition charges have been eliminated and textbooks—when available—are provided by the government. About 300,000 scholarship students are provided free room and board, clothing, medical care, and a monthly allowance. Many of them live in Havana mansions once occupied by the affluent. In ten years the government has doubled both the number of schools and students. A substantial portion of these increases occurred in rural areas where the population had been isolated and largely illiterate. Students are spared many of the hardships of

rationing and food shortages. As wards of the state they do not have to wait in queues for food or supplement their rations by covertly patronizing the black market. Thus favored, they remain overwhelmingly in accord with Castro.

During the past two years as the military has expanded its role and as Castro has become more radical and dogmatic, the morale of some of the older youths has diminished. Most of them are school dropouts and former students who are disaffected because of the drop in their standard of living after leaving school. In addition, because of the oversupply of labor for nonagricultural work, many have become idle. Their expectations rose during their school years, and they are disappointed to find few job opportunities outside of agriculture.

Last September Castro criticized such youths for being "hippies and loafers" and sent several hundred of them off to the fields. Even though Castro and many of his military colleagues wear beards, young men were told last year that beards, mustaches, and long hair were prohibited. Mod fashions and music have been repressed, and more than 50,000 youths between the ages of 17 and 27 were inducted last year for three-year hitches in agricultural work under military discipline.

Although a growing number of youths out of school seem disenchanted with the regime and the new "puritanical radicalism," a majority probably still supports the regime. They have been subjected to propaganda for a decade, and have little objective knowledge of the rest of the world. Most of them are probably convinced that they are better off under Castro than they would have been under previous administrations; in any case they can see no alternative. The older youths, however, seem more cynical in judging Castro and the accomplishments of the revolution

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than the youths in school. Their continuing loyalty is crucial for Castro. One of the major problems for his government during the next few years therefore will be to create satisfactory employment for them and to maintain their motivation and loyalty at the level of their school years.

THE PEASANTS AND URBAN WORKERS

In addition to the military caste and the youth, the peasants and some urban working groups have been the most favored groups in Cuba. They were the first beneficiaries of Castro's reforms. As expenditures for public consumption increased, they experienced an advance in their standards of living. Although a large segment of public expenditures has been spent on enlarging the military establishment and the government bureaucracy, extensive programs in public health, education, and welfare have helped those who could not afford these services before the revolution. All medical services are free and they have been expanded beyond what was previously available. The regime's expenditures for education, moreover, have not been intended for the youth alone. Extensive adult education programs and literacy drives reached more than a half million adults by 1967. Residents of rural areas probably profited the most from these benefits, since few public services were available to them before 1959.

Personal income has also increased, according to Cuban figures, and its distribution has shifted to the advantage of the poorer classes. The supply of goods and services available for consumption remained relatively stable during the first few years of the revolution, and personal income—especially among peasants and urban workers—grew. Unskilled and semiskilled workers received pay raises and other benefits which augmented their purchasing power. In addition, unemployment and underemployment were reduced, according to Castro, as large numbers of

agricultural workers migrated to better paying jobs in industry and construction.

Despite Castro's promise before he took power to "give the land to those who till it," virtually all large farms and ranches were nationalized and converted to state farms and cooperatives. In October 1963, the Second Agrarian Reform increased public ownership to about 70 percent of the land, when privately owned lands of more than 65 hectares were nationalized. Today, the owners of small farms who still till about 30 percent of the land are the only remaining private property owners in Cuba. They are kept under close state control, however, and since last year they have been required to sell all of their produce to the government. In the past they were allowed to keep some for themselves and to sell a small amount for profit. Castro has indicated that these farmers will be allowed to keep their properties, but since land may not be sold or inherited, the state will ultimately own it all.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

After an initial period of growth and expansion, the Cuban economy has stagnated, despite the annual infusion of some \$350 million in Soviet subsidies and credits. In 1967, the year of highest output since Castro came to power, Cuba's estimated GNP was only 15 percent higher than in 1957 (the highest prerevolution year), and in 1968 the drought of the previous year and economic disruptions caused a decline. During the last ten years, however, there has been a 20-percent increase in the Cuban population resulting in a 15- to 20-percent decline in per capita consumption.

Economic stagnation is the result of a variety of factors, many of which are direct outgrowths of the rapid and disruptive nationalization undertaken during the first few years of the revolution. Fundamental to all of these factors,

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however, is the inefficiency and disorganization of the new managerial class. Most white-collar workers are inexperienced and poorly educated, and political reliability has long been the main criterion for their employment.

The antibureaucracy drives and administrative purges of the last few years seriously disrupted government ministries and agencies, and their efficiency is further reduced as they are forced to provide personnel for "voluntary" agricultural work. Even more disruptive, however, have been the mass mobilizations of office workers to help in the sugar harvest. Every able-bodied adult is expected to participate, and as a result, most government offices are operated with skeleton crews from February to May.

Management is also poor because the strictly centralized system of administration stifles initiative and reduces the effectiveness of lower level managers. Centralization became even more stringent in 1968 as the military expanded its influence over the civilian bureaucracy.

Another important reason for economic failure and managerial confusion is the frequency with which economic plans and national priorities have changed during the last decade. Under the influence of Che Guevara, Castro insisted during the first few years that Cuba industrialize to remove itself from dependence on sugar. By late 1963 it was obvious that agriculture must be the mainstay of the economy, causing the postponement of the industrialization program at least until the mid-1970s. Since then, plans have concentrated on diversifying agricultural production and increasing sugar output. Many short-range programs have been expensive fiascos, however, because they were undertaken impulsively. One such scheme enacted without sufficient study last year ended in failure. Ganduls (pigeon peas) were planted between established rows of coffee plants

with the hope of increasing the output of both crops. After several months, however, the ganduls were choking out the coffee plants, and city dwellers, organized into agricultural brigades, were drafted to remove them.

A labor shortage for agricultural work and a surplus of white-collar workers add to the problems causing the economy to stagnate. The problem worsens yearly, moreover, as the schools graduate technically skilled students who shun manual labor. Severe drought during four of the last eight years has also caused serious difficulties. Finally, the US trade embargo has forced Cuba to import large amounts of capital goods to replace US-built machinery and equipment for which spare parts are no longer available. This has restricted further Cuba's ability to import other needed goods.

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

Despite these problems Castro is optimistic. In his speech on 2 January 1969 he was ebullient and confident, predicting that many of the economic goals for 1970 will be fulfilled. Castro was probably correct in appraising the various factors that point to an economic recovery this year. Rainfall has been normal, large quantities of fertilizer have been used, and the military can probably organize and manage the economy more authoritatively and rationally than the civilian bureaucrats. These factors may continue and result in further improvements in 1970.

During the first half of 1969, increased agricultural output should restore the economy at least to the level of 1967 when it was about 15 percent above the best prerevolution year. Fruit and vegetable crops will probably increase, and meat and dairy products and other foodstuffs should be in greater supply. Furthermore, although it is not likely that 10 million tons of sugar will be milled in 1970, Cuba can probably produce a record crop.

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CUBAN SUGAR PRODUCTION (Millions of metric tons)			
1961	6.8	1965	6.1
1962	4.8	1966	4.5
1963	3.8	1967	6.1
1964	4.4	1968	5.2

(In 1952 under Batista, the largest crop on record was produced, 7.2)

Gains in sugar output, however, may be offset by disruptions elsewhere in the economy because large numbers of workers will be diverted from their regular work and mobilized to cut cane. It is still too early to determine to what extent gains made in the economy this year will benefit the consumer. In the past Castro has exported food commodities to earn foreign exchange while rationing them at home. He recently put sugar on the ration list in an effort to gain foreign exchange and because his last harvest was a low one. In addition, per capita gains will be inhibited by the high rate of population growth.

Long range economic growth is uncertain. Plans have centered on agricultural diversification and increased sugar production, but a number of problems must be resolved before production goals can be fulfilled. Castro has attempted to remedy the acute shortage of regular agricultural workers by investing heavily in mechanization and by attempting to glorify the arcadian way of life where manual work in the fields would be the most dignified and most highly rewarded profession. In 1968 he mobilized hundreds of thousands of civilians and military personnel for agricultural work, and this year even greater sacrifice will be expected. Most Cubans will be required to work six and a half days a week, and to "volunteer" their vacations and leave time for additional work

in the fields. Castro predicted continuing austerity when he said that the revolution will be "harsh, implacable, and inflexible."

These efforts may help increase agricultural output over the next few years. A Western diplomat in Havana stated last summer that the city workers he observed in the fields "enthusiastically" participated in pastoral work. He predicted some significant gains as a result. Moreover, Soviet aid to Cuba continues to support Castro's vigorous effort to expand and renovate Cuba's sugar mills. Large Soviet credits have been extended for this purpose, and the 1969 Soviet-Cuban trade protocol now being negotiated in Moscow may expand it further. In order to maintain economic growth at rates above the population growth rate, however, Castro will have to endorse basic and wide ranging institutional reforms. Without more rational and professional management and planning the Cuban economy may continue to fluctuate without achieving a lasting and significant rate of growth.

CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

Cuban-Soviet relations are characterized by a broad mutuality of interests which far outweigh the contentiousness engendered by Castro's limited assertions of independence. Soviet economic and military support is crucial. Castro realizes that no other patron or group of beneficiary states can be expected to provide aid and credits in quantities approaching the \$350 million injected yearly by the USSR. For their part, the Soviets will probably consider a "Marxist-Leninist" Cuba as a net asset so long as Castro does not side with Peking and does not seriously disrupt Soviet efforts to establish better relations with Latin American governments.

Although Cuba is not a showcase of socialism in the Western Hemisphere, it is the only underdeveloped country of the "third world" to

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
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have joined the "socialist camp." Cuba is still an important asset to the Soviets as a propaganda centerpiece and as their only ally in Latin America. Moreover, even though Moscow and Havana pursue conflicting policies there at times, it appears that Moscow gains from both. The USSR continues to support "old guard" orthodox Communist parties in Latin America rather than the Cuban-supported groups that espouse violence now. By allowing the Cubans a sphere of influence among extremist revolutionary factions in Latin America, however, the Soviets have prevented the Chinese from gaining more than a few adherents in the area. Most Cuban-supported groups look ultimately to Moscow as the center of world Communism, and may even believe that the USSR covertly supports them through the Cubans.

Thus, Castro's obsession with pursuing a policy of violence in Latin America and his pretensions of independence from Moscow are tolerable nuisances to the Soviets. They have not retaliated by reducing or seriously limiting the shipment of vitally needed goods, and in 1968 Soviet aid and credits actually increased. Moscow, however, does use selective restraints to influence Havana and put pressure on Castro. During the annual negotiations of bilateral trade agreements, for instance, Moscow probably exerts psychological pressures by protracting the talks over a two-to-three-month period while urging the Cubans to improve the management of their economy. In January 1968, Castro announced that consumption of petroleum products had increased by eight percent and that Soviet deliveries would increase by only two percent. He declared that rationing would be necessary to make up the difference. By refusing to supply unlimited amounts of petroleum, Moscow was probably attempting to force Havana to utilize its resources rationally.

On the other hand, when Cuban-Soviet interests are in direct conflict and when Moscow for

its own reasons requires Cuban support, Castro can be expected to give it.



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Soviet efforts to influence Cuban domestic programs have been less successful. The major irritant in their relations is probably the inefficiency with which the economy is managed and the waste and misallocation of Soviet aid. Soviet technicians are often frustrated by the slovenly and lazy performance of Cuban workers and by the uninhibited flair of the Cuban temperament, which to them amounts to "Marxism-cha, cha, cha."

Moscow has used pressures, technology, and aid to encourage more coherent planning and management and to order and rationalize the Cuban economy. Soviet designed cane-cutting machines were introduced in 1964, but after several years of testing they proved unusable. The



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Brezhnev and Castro in Moscow

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Soviets have also experimented with hybrid plants and livestock, and have assigned an estimated several thousand technicians and advisers to assist the Cubans.


Probably with some encouragement from the Soviets, Castro introduced a system of "material incentives" for workers in January 1965. This move was an important retrenchment from the "dogmatist" views of Che Guevara who favored only the concept of moral rewards for work. Even this innovation, however, was abandoned about two years later when Castro reaffirmed his support of Guevara's view. The "orthodox" programs to motivate and mobilize workers, however, were not instituted pervasively until 1968 during the "revolutionary offensive." Although the Soviets have taken no public notice of these sweeping radical reforms they may see them as similar to the disruptive Cultural Revolution in China.

"EXPORT" OF THE REVOLUTION

Since 1959 Castro has dreamed of seeing his revolution emulated elsewhere in Latin America. Like his aggressive hostility toward the US, the policy was originally based on a paranoid fear and suspicion of his powerful neighbors and on a desire to defend Cuba by distracting potential enemies. Even before the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, Castro believed correctly that his regime would be the target of conspiracy and violence from conservative forces in Latin America. Young and unsure of the course his revolution was taking at home and abroad, Castro tried to enlist the support of other young leftist extremists in Latin America to ratify and emulate the Cuban experience. During this period, Castro was strongly influenced by Che Guevara, the "roving revolutionary" who had joined the 26th of July Movement in 1956. Guevara was the Trotskyist in the Cuban leadership; he believed that Cuban resources and energies should be


directed abroad to instigate and support other radical revolutions.

Under Guevara's influence Cuban foreign policy became more extreme and more carefully organized. In 1959 and 1960 Castro supported at least four small expeditionary forces against his Caribbean neighbors. Between 1961 and 1964 at least 1,500 to 2,000 young Latin Americans received guerrilla training in Cuba. Castro sounded the keynote of this policy on 26 July 1960 when he said, "we promise to continue making Cuba the example that can convert the cordillera of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American continent."



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From late 1961 through 1964, Cuban subversive activities reached their apogee. The most spectacular event was the discovery of a three-ton cache of weapons on a Venezuelan beach in November 1963. Cuban supported guerrillas and agents were active in at least six other Latin American countries.



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Guevara, who had been the principal architect of Cuban subversive efforts, resigned his official posts in October and traveled abroad for about four months—mainly in Africa where he appraised the potential for Cuban assistance to revolutionary groups. In 1965 he commanded a Cuban contingent which fought with the rebels in the Congo (Kinshasa). He became disillusioned with his efforts there, however, and returned to Cuba late in 1965 or early 1966 where he began making plans for the movement he later led in Bolivia.

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delivered an explicit call for violent revolution in the hemisphere, and thereafter he began to build up propaganda support for the effort Guevara was organizing. From mid-1966 until October 1967 when Guevara's insurgency collapsed in Bolivia, Cuban support for Latin American guerrillas approached the levels of the 1961-1963 period. In May 1967, Venezuelan guerrillas, escorted by Cuban military advisers, landed in Venezuela to join insurgent groups. Other landings probably occurred the same year. Cuban military advisers may also have infiltrated Guatemala during 1967. Havana's consummate effort to export the revolution, however, was Guevara's movement in Bolivia. His failure and death in October 1967 and the failures of Cuban-supported insurgents in Venezuela apparently influenced Castro to begin a serious reappraisal of tactics for "exporting" the revolution.

During the 15 months since then, Castro has discussed foreign policy in only a few of more than 25 major speeches, and he has almost entirely ignored the subject of "revolution" in Latin

America. During this period he has been inordinately preoccupied with Cuban domestic problems. Without the collaboration of Guevara who had always been one of the main designers of Havana's foreign policy, Cuban subversive efforts have apparently lost some of their importance.

Cuba continues to support insurgents in Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombia, but at rates substantially below the levels of 1966 and 1967. Although Castro is not likely to renounce the use of violence as an instrument of Cuban foreign policy in the near future, he has not emphasized it in more than a year. Since Guevara's death he has not attempted to initiate new areas of insurgency and has confined his aid to and focused his propaganda effort on viable guerrilla movements.

It is unlikely that Castro will admit that his dream to "create other Cubas" has failed. Even without Guevara, and even though he can be expected to concentrate on domestic matters for the next few years, Cuba will probably continue to support subversion in the hemisphere on a selective basis. It is not likely to reach the scope or intensity of earlier years unless a local revolutionary group seems to be making definite headway.

PROSPECTS FOR CASTRO'S TENURE

After a decade in power, Fidel Castro rules absolutely through a totalitarian personal apparatus. The military and security forces under the control of Fidel's younger brother Raul are well-trained, well-equipped, and effective in identifying and eliminating opponents of the regime. In addition, most youths, students, peasants, and urban workers, support the regime and provide Castro with a reliable constituency.


There is no evidence of organized opposition to Castro and his regime. Whatever course Castro

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follows, he seems likely to retain the hard-core support of the groups he has favored. They realize that they are better off than they were before, and they see no alternative to him.



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